Collingwood has failed to make a significant impact in the history of twentieth century philosophy either because he has been dismissed as a dusty old idealist committed to the very metaphysics the analytical school was trying to leave behind, or because his later work has been interpreted as advocating the dissolution of philosophy into history. I argue that Collingwood's key philosophical works are a sustained attempt to defend the view that philosophy is an autonomous discipline with a distinctive domain of inquiry and that Collingwood's attempt to defend the autonomy of philosophy is intimately connected to his defence of intensional notions against the kind of meaning scepticism which came to prevail from the 1920s. I defend the philosophical claim that there is a third way between the idealist metaphysics with which Collingwood is often associated and the neoempiricist agenda which characterised analytic philosophy in mid-century by defending the hermeneutic thesis that Collingwood's work is a sustained attempt to articulate a conception of philosophy as an epistemologically first science. Since there is a via media between the old metaphysics and the new empiricism there is no need to choose between a certain kind of armchair metaphysics and a scientifically informed ontology.
the genetic story does nonetheless identify a certain philosophical trend in which the rise of the analytic tradition coincides with the increasing popularity of naturalism and the progressive erosion of a conception of philosophy as 'first science'.
How does Collingwood fit into the story of the rise of analytic philosophy?
Not much has been written about Collingwood's intervention in the history of twentieth century philosophy, either because he has been dismissed as a dusty old idealist committed to the very metaphysics the analytical school was trying to leave behind, or because his later work has been interpreted as advocating the dissolution of philosophy into history. This paper reassesses Collingwood's intervention in the history of twentieth century philosophy by taking a close look first, at the philosophical tête-à-tête with (the early) Ryle which took place in the aftermath of the publication of An Essay on Philosophical Method, 7 and then at his attack on Ayer in An Essay on Metaphysics. 8 I argue, firstly, that Collingwood's key philosophical works are a sustained attempt to defend the view that philosophy is an autonomous discipline with a distinctive method and subject matter and, secondly, that his attempt to defend the autonomy of philosophy is intimately connected to his defence of intensional notions against the kind of scepticism about meaning which came to prevail from the early 1920s and which found full expression in Quine. Collingwood saw the attempt to eliminate intensional notions along with traditional metaphysics as a case of throwing out the semantic baby together with the ontological bathwater. Both in An Essay on Philosophical Method and in An Essay on Metaphysics Collingwood was arguing 6 Timothy Williamson has recently challenged this narrative in The Philosophy of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007) , chapter 1. Williamson argues that a new narrative structure for the history of philosophy is needed because since the 1960s philosophy has witnessed "a revival of metaphysical theorizing, realist in spirit…", p.
19. Yet, Williamson himself may ultimately be said to belong to this narrative, at least to the extent that he denies philosophy has a distinctive method and autonomous subject matter. 3 against that philosophical trend which, from the moderate empiricism of Ayer to the radical empiricism of Quine, is often identified with the narrative of the rise of analytic philosophy. That might well be the reason why, in spite of having made one of the most significant contributions to meta-philosophy in the twentieth century, Collingwood has not become part of the philosophical canon: his message was not sufficiently world-historical.
The Essay on Philosophical Method and the correspondence with Ryle
The correspondence between Collingwood and Ryle was prompted by an article in Mind 9 where Ryle had presented a vitriolic critique of Collingwood's defence of the ontological argument in chapter IV of An Essay on Philosophical Method. Here
Collingwood claims that the ontological proof applies in one case only, namely to the objects of philosophical thought or, as he puts it in a private letter to Ryle, to 'that which we are thinking about when we are thinking philosophically'. 10 Collingwood claims that when it is properly understood as applying to the objects of philosophical thought, the ontological proof will be viable, even if in a revised form:
My own view of the Ontological proof is that there is "something in it" as we say... but that its defect, in its traditional form, is that this something is often left vague, and that the term God (as anyone might indeed guess, who is familiar with the general drift of neo-Platonic and early medieval thought) has to be taken as standing for "that which we are thinking about when we are thinking philosophically". When this matter is made clear, it is to me also clear that the traditional ontological proof will have to be revised to bring it, so to speak, up to date; and this is what I have tried to do...
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In this revised form, the ontological proof applies not to God but to philosophical propositions, propositions which, according to Collingwood, define the domain of 9 Ryle, G., 'Mr Collingwood and the Ontological Argument ', Mind, 44 (1935) Understood in this way, the proposition 'Mind exists' has existential import, but is also contingent rather than necessary. Ryle did not explicitly say so, but he could have said that the proposition 'Mind exists' is merely one amongst a series of 'systematically misleading expressions' in which the grammatical form of the proposition leads us to postulate the existence of an entity, in this case 'Mind', over and beyond the particulars or class of objects in which the concept is instantiated. concept of duty and utility even when such concepts have mutually overlapping empirical classes and thus fail to 'cut nature at the joints'. The distinction between the concept of mind and matter, for Collingwood is analogous to the distinction between duty and utility. It is, in other words, a purely intensional distinction to which there correspond no well defined empirical classes and which is nonetheless required in order to avoid conceptual errors of the kind that would arise by conflating the criteria of identification for actions and events.
As the doctrine of the overlap of classes makes clear, Collingwood's defence of philosophical propositions is not motivated by a metaphysical agenda for his goal is not to advocate the existence of Mind and Matter as mind-independent metaphysical entities, but to drive a wedge between the extension and the intension of concepts. As he puts it in the correspondence: The concepts of Mind and Matter, according to Collingwood are 'transcendentals'.
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They are concepts that cannot be justified empirically because they determine the meaning of what it is to be. Whilst we may justify the employment of empirical concepts, such as those of crystalline or sedimentary rocks, by pointing to their instances, we cannot justify in a like manner the concepts of duty and utility, or the concepts of mind and matter, for the objects which fall under one of these concepts may also fall under the other. 20 We can get a hold on such concepts, and the distinctions that they enable us to make, only if we acknowledge that the intension of concepts is not reducible to their extension and that a theory of concepts is not two concepts 'are the same thing' in the sense that a thing which exemplifies the one exemplifies the other also, but 'their being is not the same' in the sense that being an instance of the one is not the same as being an instance of the other. propositions of a higher order which express interesting (non-trivial) conceptual truths and supply the verification conditions at work in different explanatory contexts.
Collingwood refers to these higher order propositions which express the meaning of causation at work in different explanatory contexts as absolute presuppositions and contrasts them to presuppositions that are merely relative. A presupposition is relative if it may be discarded without endangering the explanatory practice within which it is formulated. For example, the presupposition that 'the cause of malaria is the bite of a mosquito' is verifiable relative to the criterion of verifiability provided by sense II of causation and may be discarded without threatening the practice of medicine. A presupposition, by contrast, is absolute if it cannot be discarded without giving up the explanatory practice which it grounds. Thus, whilst doctors may incorrectly and yet consistently deny that there is a causal relation between smoking and lung cancer, they cannot consistently deny that 'the cause of an event is an antecedent condition by producing or preventing which we can produce or prevent that whose effect it is said to be' without giving up on medicine as a possible scientific enquiry. That 'the cause of an event is an antecedent condition by producing or preventing which we can produce or prevent that whose effect it is said to be' is analytic for medical practitioners.
The different senses of causation at work in the Geisteswissenschaften and the But, nota bene, to say that absolute presuppositions are non-empirical propositions which express interesting conceptual truths is not the same as saying that to deny, e.g. that 'there are actions' is to utter a contradiction in the way in which classical rationalist metaphysicians believed that to deny 'God exists' involves a contradiction. The contradiction arises only for the practitioner (historians, or natural scientists) who presupposes a certain conception of causation. There is no contradiction in claiming that 'there are no actions' as long as one does not seek to engage in the kind of explanatory practice which presupposes the intelligibility of the world of human action. The predicament in which the practitioners of a science find themselves is thus not dissimilar to the logician's predicament as described by Lewis
Carroll in 'What the Tortoise said to Achilles' 27 . Carroll argued that the logician's ability to endorse the conclusion of any given deductive argument relies on the prior acceptance of a principle of valid inference which is implicitly appealed to when one infers from the premises to the conclusions and without which the inference would lack validity. Like the logician in Carroll's paper, first-order scientists are necessarily committed to principles of inference which determine the nature of their explanandum and which they are not at freedom to deny without changing the subject.
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Collingwood's criticism of Ayer, like his earlier criticism of Ryle, is that there are propositions which are true in virtue of meaning, and thus analytic in the broad sense, but which are not tautologous or analytic in the narrower sense accepted by logical positivism. So understood, Collingwood's claim that one should turn metaphysics into a study of absolute presuppositions implies not that metaphysics is an enquiry into what the practitioners of a science believe, but that absolute presuppositions express conceptual truths which cannot be discarded without overthrowing the very form of enquiry which they make possible.
The view that absolute presuppositions express interesting conceptual truths has substantive implications for the ways in which one understands the nature of defending a view of philosophy as an autonomous discipline with a distinctive method and subject matter. His historicism would be a thinly disguised form of naturalism.
On the reading presented in this paper, Collingwood's work is best understood as resisting the philosophical trend which is often identified with the rise of analytic philosophy: the gradual erosion and ultimate elimination of the a priori and the related notion of analyticity. Whilst Collingwood did share with the newly emerging analytical tradition a critique of metaphysics understood as an ontological enquiry into the ultimate structure of reality, his criticism of metaphysics was not motivated by a desire to debunk either the epistemological distinction between empirical and a priori propositions or the semantic distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. On the contrary, his work is best read as a sustained attempt to defend intensional notions against the neo-empiricist agenda which came to dominate analytical philosophy in its early stages.
Conclusion
The Collingwood-Ryle exchange offers an interesting window onto the origins of Collingwood's defence of the autonomy of philosophy was caught between the proponents of two powerful historical trends, one in decline, the other in the ascent.
Squeezed, both logically and historically speaking, between two currents that allowed for no third way, his defence of the autonomy of philosophy was hardly understood.
As a result, An Essay on Philosophical Method and An Essay on Metaphysics have
failed to be recognised for what they arguably are: the two most sustained attempts to carve out a distinctive domain of enquiry for philosophical analysis and to defend the autonomy of philosophy in the twentieth century.
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